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This paper tests the main hypothesis that firms that cross-list have higher valuations, 
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1. Introduction 
        Over the past two decades, an increasing number of firms, especially those from 
the emerging market countries, has cross-listed their shares on the major foreign stock 
exchanges around the world. Based on the Annual Report and Statistics from the 
World Federation of Exchanges, Table 1 shows that up until 2004, there were 2,632 
foreign listings in the world’s 50 major stock exchanges. The total value of shares 
trading for foreign firms has increased to US$4,987,018 million, which accounts for 
12% of total value of share trading around the world. In 2004 alone, 253 new foreign 
stocks were issued to the international capital markets.   
This trend has caused tremendous competition among major stock exchanges 
around the world.
1 However, not all stock exchanges have equal appeal and foreign 
listings cluster in the United States and the United Kingdom. There are three major 
stock exchanges in the two countries, NYSE, NASDAQ and LSE, which are the three 
largest stock exchanges in the world in terms of average daily turnover (Table 1). 
Figure 1 shows that those three stock exchanges had approximately a US$25 million 
value of share trading in 2004. This accounted for 61% of the total value of share 
trading around the world. About 1,150 foreign companies were listing on these two 
destinations in 2004, which accounted for 44% of the total foreign stock 
cross-listings.    
    A main motive for cross-listing is a firm's need for capital funds. Several 
important questions emerge: Why do some but not other foreign firms want to 
                                                        
1  E.g. Santos and Scheinkman (2001) provide a solid theoretical framework for this mechanism and its 
implications; see also Coffee (2002).     3
cross-list their shares overseas? What are the trade-offs for firms when choosing 
between the US and the UK as their cross-listing destinations?   
  In an important recent paper, Doidge et al (2004) find, for a sample of 40 
countries, that “…at the end of 1997, foreign companies with shares cross-listed in the 
U.S. had Tobin’s q ratios that were 16.5% higher than the q ratios of non-cross-listed 
firms from the same country.” In this paper, we take a further step. We present 
evidence for a sample of 6 source countries in the Asia-Pacific region in 2003-2004 
comparing the cross-listing premium in the US versus the UK destination. Our sample 
of source nations includes: Australia, China, India, Japan, Korea and Taiwan; e.g. 
Figure 2.
2  Our main idea is that source countries geography and proximity may 
matter for cross-listing destination premium. Firms may follow the leaders in a 
geographic region and follow the trends in cross-listing destination. For example, 
given the closer ties and proximity between Latin America and North America, firms 
in Latin America may choose the US destination. In the British sphere, firms may 
choose the UK destination. We chose the Asia-Pacific region, including China, where 
there is not a strict clear pattern of ties in terms of proximity to the US and the UK.
3    
One would expect that the more (less) stringent the corporate governance 
arrangement in the listing destination, the higher (lower) the increase in valuation for 
cross-listing firms. In particular, because the corporate governance standards are 
higher in both the US and the UK relative to the rest of the world, firms choosing to 
                                                        
2  Most notable in our study is the focus on the specific geographic region of source companies, and the inclusion 
of China in the sample. 
 
3  In our sample, 13 large companies, including Honda, Sony and Toyota in Japan cross-list both in the US and the 
UK destination, and are possibly trend setters in the region. Froot and Dabora (1999) show evidence of arbitrage 
opportunities in multi-listing cases.   4
cross-list in those two destinations should have a higher increase in valuation, i.e., a 
cross-listing premium. From an accounting perspective, the US has better investor 
protection than the UK; hence we would expect the cross-listing premium to be higher 
for firms listing in the US than those listing in the UK. A recent paper by Doidge, 
Karolyi and Stulz (2007) also provide, among other things,  an analysis of the 
"cross-listing premium" differences between the US and London.
4 Their sample of 
source countries is very large and broad and they find a significant difference in favor 
of US cross-listing versus London cross-listing. Our results indicate that in the 
restricted Asia-Pacific geographic region, it is less clear whether or not a significant 
difference between US and UK premium remains, given that trend setters from the 
region  cross-list  in  both  destinations.     
    Based on a country panel dataset, which includes 4,491 firms’ valuation 
observations from the six Asia-Pacific countries, we present empirical evidence on US 
and UK cross-listing premiums with univariate and multivariate econometric analysis. 
The empirical evidence presented is consistent with the hypothesis that cross-listing 
commands a premium both in the US and the UK. However, we find that the evidence 
on the difference in premium across the US and UK is mixed. Using univariate, OLS 
and random effects models we found a significant difference; with premiums in the 
US larger than the UK, consistent with Doidge et al (2007). However, using a 
treatment effects methodology, this difference is not robust. Hence, geography and 
proximity may be factors that mitigate the corporate governance effects of 
                                                        
4  After completion of this paper, we became aware of the paper by Doidge, Karolyi and Stulz (2007). 
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cross-listing. Our evidence indicates that, both in the US and UK unobserved factors 
account for a negative correlation between the likelihood of cross-listing and 
valuation, but observables show that cross-listing commands a premium on valuation.   
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In the next section, we review the 
previous research on international listing. In section 3, we compare the listing 
requirements and costs between the US and the UK. Then, in Section 4 we discuss a 
simple model based on Doidge et al (2004) and develop the main hypothesis. Section 
5 describes the data and the empirical results are presented in Section 6. The last 
section offers concluding remarks; and an appendix provides details about the 
econometric methodology. 
2. The reasons for international listing 
Why do firms want to cross-list? We summarize four common explanations 
here.
5   
2.1 Market Segmentation Hypothesis   
The market segmentation hypothesis is the most oft-cited reason for cross-listing. 
It is claimed that it allows investors to avoid cross-border  barriers to investment. 
Those barriers may come from regulatory restrictions, information problems such as 
uninformative accounting practices or simply from the lack of knowledge about a 
security (e.g. Merton 1987). Removing the barriers and integrating markets would 
allow for more efficient diversification and lower the risk of a security. Based on this 
                                                        
5  Karolyi (1998, 2005) did a thorough review of the cross-listing literature; see also Tomunen and Tortsilla (2005) 
for a study of the relationship between cross-listing and mergers and acquisitions. 
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hypothesis, a firm’s stock price will rise, and the cost of capital will decline in 
response to the cross-listing.   
Two seminal studies of this literature are Foerster and Karolyi (1999) and Miller 
(1999). Foerster and Karolyi (1999) examine weekly abnormal returns for two years 
before and after the US cross-listing by establishing an American Depositary Receipt 
(ADR) program.
6  The result is firms that cross-list through ADR issuance eventually 
experience an unexpected increase in their stock price, of about 10% in the year 
before the listing. However, this unexpected increase is followed by a decrease of 
some 9% in the year after listing. Miller's (1999) study focuses on the 80 days around 
the cross-listing event and finds a positive 1.15% average abnormal return for 183 
ADRs between 1985 and 1995. Other studies, like Alexander, Eun and Janakiramanan 
(1988), Foerster and Karolyi (1993), Jayaraman, Shastri and Tandon (1993), all use a 
similar approach to examine the stock price reaction when firms cross-list in the US. 
The evidence is of a positive price reaction to cross-listing. In addition, Alexander, 
Eun and Janakiramanan (1987), Foerster and Karolyi (1993, 1999), Jayaraman, 
Narayanan, Shastri and Tandon (1993), Karolyi (1998), and Errunza and Miller 
(2000) all find evidence that confirms the prediction that the cost of capital declines 
following the cross-listing.   
2.2 Liquidity Hypothesis 
Cross-listing can also be explained by a liquidity argument. From a stock trader’s 
perspective, the greater the liquidity the smaller the spread. Mittoo (1992) presents a 
                                                        
6  The ADR program permits individuals in US markets to invest in non-US firms in US dollar-denominated 
receipts redeemable by specialized US financial institutions (Depositories) in the underlying shares.   7
market survey, which shows that managers of foreign companies cite increased 
trading liquidity (28% of respondents) as a primary factor in their decision to 
cross-list. Cross-listing would help firms to get access to more investors, which would 
lead to higher volume. For instance, Tinic and West (1974) find that 112 Canadian 
stocks cross-listed on US exchanges have lower bid-ask spreads than their purely 
domestically traded counterparts. Amihud and Mendelson (1986) analyze asset 
pricing and the bid-ask spread using a theoretical model. They proxy the lack of 
liquidity as the cost of immediately executing a trade and, in their empirical test, they 
find evidence consistent with increased liquidity from multiple exchange listings. 
Foerster and Karolyi (1998), Domowitz, Glen and Madhavan (1998), and Smith and 
Sofianos (1997) all study the impact of US cross-listing on the costs of transacting a 
particular security, and generally find that spreads decrease and trading volume 
increases following a cross-listing, both of which reflect an increase in liquidity. Moel 
(2001) investigates the effect of ADRs on the liquidity as well as other attributes of 
domestic stock markets. He finds that ADR listings decrease liquidity in domestic 
stock markets due to increased ADR order flow in US markets.   
Although there is mounting evidence that is consistent with the market 
segmentation hypothesis and the liquidity hypothesis, they face a number of 
challenges in explaining the trend of cross-listing. The most evident one is that if 
cross-listing were to overcome the market segmentation and improve liquidity, thus 
lowering the cost of capital and bid-ask spreads, every foreign firm should choose to   8
do so. Still, the majority of the public traded firms do not cross-list their shares 
overseas. 
2.3 Information Environment   
    The information disclosure requirements are often more stringent in the 
cross-listing destination countries, like the US and the UK. The information 
environment hypothesis assumes that some form of information asymmetry or market 
incompleteness exists. Cross-listing to a more stringent disclosure requirement regime 
allows firms to signal outside investors that they have better prospects than others. 
Earlier studies on this direction are Cantale (1996), Fuerst (1998) and Moel (1999). 
They develop theoretical models, which establish the signaling equilibrium in which 
firms that list on markets with high disclosure standards signal that they are 
high-value firms. In particular, Fuerst’s (1998) model predicts that firms that cross-list 
in the US will experience abnormal operating performance, especially firms coming 
from less strict regulatory regimes.
7  
Evidence from empirical studies generally supports the predictions of those 
theoretical papers. Baker, Nofsinger and Weaver (2002) find that NYSE listings are 
associated with greater analyst coverage and media hits. Lang, Lins and Miller (2003) 
compare 235 US cross-listing firms with 4859 non-US cross-listing firms. They find 
that cross-listed firms have more than twice analysts’ coverage than non cross-listed 
firms, and the accuracy of forecasts increases by 1.36% on average. Moreover, they 
find that Tobin’s q is much higher for cross listed firms, and is positively associated 
                                                        
7  Moel (1999) develops a two-country and two-security market equilibrium model where the security price 
increases as a function of the level of information disclosure. This model predicts that firms with higher volatility, 
operating in a low disclosure and low information trading environment, will disclose more information.   9
with the increased analyst coverage and improved accuracy. Bailey, Karolyi and 
Salva (2005) use an event study to investigate 427 firms’ cumulative absolute 
abnormal returns and abnormal trading volume before and after US cross-listings. 
They show that the three-day abnormal return volatility increases from 2.75% to 
3.38%. This is significant after controlling for the number of analysts, the forecast 
surprise relative to the median analyst, and the dispersion of their forecasts. 
2.4 Corporate Governance and the “Bonding” Hypothesis 
Coffee (1999, 2002) and Stulz (1999) are the first to point out that corporate 
governance matters for cross-listing, the so-called “bonding” hypothesis. They argue 
that firms with poor home country corporate governance often cross-list their 
securities on stock markets located in countries with more rigorous governance 
standards. “Bonding” to more rigorous governance standards improves access to 
capital, which, in turn, lowers the cost of capital and increases the value of the firm. 
Firms outside the US are generally controlled by large shareholders and, from the 
perspective of the controlling shareholder, there are costs as well as benefits for 
cross-listing. Cross-listing limits the ability of the controlling shareholder to take 
private benefits from their firms, but it also provides external finance, and funds the 
investment opportunities available. Controlling shareholders are willing to “bond” 
themselves not to take private benefits when the value of having access to external 
capital is large relative to the size of private benefits. In such circumstances, firms 
often have investment opportunities that require external financing.   10
A sizable literature has tested the bonding hypothesis. Reese and Weisbach 
(2002), for example, examine the relation between the number of US cross-listings 
and the level of investor protection in the cross-listed firms’ home countries. Their 
results show that: i. Equity issues increase following all cross-listings, regardless of 
shareholder protection; ii. The increase is larger for cross-listings from countries with 
weak protection; iii. Equity issues following cross-listings in the US will tend to be in 
the US for firms from countries with strong protection, and outside the US for firms 
from countries with weak protection. To avoid the limitations of event studies, 
Doidge, et al (2004) take another approach. They examine the firms’ valuation 
premium with and without cross-listing, using Tobin’s q as the measure of valuation. 
Using data from 40 countries on the valuation samples of 714 cross-listed and 4078 
non cross-listed firms in 1997, they find a significant positive valuation premium for 
firms cross-listed in the US. Doidge (2004) estimates relationships between US 
cross-listings and the private benefits to insiders controlling the firm. His sample 
includes 745 firms domiciled in 20 countries over the 1994-2001 periods. A total of 
137 of those firms are cross-listed in the US market. He finds that private benefits to 
insiders decline for firms cross-listed in the US.   
3. Comparison of Listing Requirements and Costs between US and UK 
In this paper, we adopt the idea of “bonding” and present a theoretical model, 
followed by empirical tests to further explain how firms make cross-listing decisions, 
with particular focus on where to cross-list, thus comparing the US versus the UK. 
Listing requirements for the US and the UK stock markets differs greatly. The main   11
differences are on the accounting standards accepted by the exchanges and the level of 
disclosure requirements.   
In the US, American Depositary Receipts (ADRs) is the primary way for non-US 
firms to list in the US. It is a negotiable certificate that usually represents a foreign 
company's publicly traded equity. Depositary Receipts are created when a broker 
purchases the company's shares on the home stock market and delivers them to the 
depositary's local custodian bank, such as the Bank of New York, Citibank or Morgan 
Guaranty (now JP Morgan Chase). These financial intermediaries hold the foreign 
shares denominated in foreign currency and issue the US shares denominated in the 
US dollars, which are called an ADR. They can be traded freely, just like any other 
security, either on an exchange or on the over-the-counter market. Such trading 
alleviates certain obstacles associated with investing directly in the home market of 
non-U.S. companies. For instance, with ADRs, investors do not have to learn about 
unfamiliar foreign custody fees or carry out foreign exchange transactions. 
There are three levels of ADRs in the US. Each of them represents a different 
level of disclosure requirement and costs. Table 2 shows the basic differences among 
the three. Level I ADRs are only traded over-the-counter as Pink Sheet issues. It does 
not require Generally Accepted Accounting Principles (GAAP) reconciliation. Firms 
are also exempt from SEC filing under Rule 12g3-2(b), which allows home country 
accounting statements with adequate English translation. But Level I ADRs are traded 
with limited liquidity. Level II ADRs require partial GAAP reconciliation for different 
accounting items. Level III ADRs require full GAAP reconciliation. Both Level II and   12
Level III require full SEC disclosure with Form 20-F and are the most prestigious and 
costly type of listing. As only Level II and Level III ADRs have stringent governance 
requirements, which are also confirmed by empirical studies, such as Doidge et al. 
(2004), we focus our study on these two types only.
8 
    To cross-list in the UK, firms can list their equity directly on the London Stock 
Exchange’s main market or through the Depositary Receipts (DRs), including Global 
Depositary Receipts (GDRs) and American Depositary Receipts (ADRs), and Euro 
Depositary Receipts (EDRs), which are denominated in euros. The disclosure 
requirements are more flexible compared with those in the US. Firms can adopt 
International Accounting Standards (IAS), US or UK Generally Accepted Accounting 
Principles (GAAP). And it is often believed that IAS gives managers more discretion 
to do earning management than US GAAP. Moreover, if firms’ stocks are only traded 
by institutional investors, which are called Professional DRs, the requirements are 
even less demanding. Firms’ financial accounting statements can be prepared under 
home country GAAP only, and no reconciliation between local GAAP and IAS, US or 
UK GAAP is required. Even the consolidation for multiple entities’ financial 
statements is not required.   
    According  to  the  above  comparison,  generally  speaking,  the  listing  requirements 
for cross-listing in the UK are less stringent than those in the US. Evidence from the 
previous cross-listing location studies is also consistent with this conclusion. Biddle 
and Saudagaran (1995), for example, study the reporting and regulatory costs of eight 
                                                        
8  There are also Reg S/Rule 144a and OTC pink sheets DRs in the US, but those are not used in our sample.   13
major listing locations around the world. In their study, they sent out a survey to 200 
individuals who are actively involved in the foreign listing process. Those participants 
included corporate managers, investment bankers, public accountants, stock exchange 
officials, attorneys and academics. The survey asked them to rank several financial 
and regulatory factors in the eight countries. As reported in Table 3, the factors 
included statutory reporting requirements, exchange reporting requirements, capital 
market expectations, and overall disclosure levels. This study shows that the US has 
the highest disclosure level, which is higher than the UK.     
    As shown above, previous studies exclusively focused on the cross-listing 
destination to the US market.
9 In the UK, the London Stock Exchange (LSE) is one 
of the largest stock exchanges around the world. Including the LSE allows us to 
determine whether cross-listing can increase firm’s valuation on a non-US market. 
The difference in the premium and the differential costs for cross-listing either in the 
US or the UK can help us to explain firm’s cross-listing location preference.
10  
4. Theoretical Models 
    Recent ownership structure studies have shown that the ownership structure of 
firms is more concentrated in countries other than the US around the world (e.g. 
Prowse, 1992; Edwards and Fischer, 1994; La Porta et al., 1998). In many countries, 
especially developing ones, the primary agency conflict for large corporations is the 
                                                        
9  Some new studies focus on cross-listings in Europe and UK and discuss the influence of geographical proximity on 
cross-listings, e.g. Pagano, Röell, and Zechner (2002), Sarkissian and Schill (2009). 
 
10  There are other recent papers on cross-listing premium including Gozzi, Levine, and Schmukler (2008), 
King and Segal (2008), Sarkissian and Schill (2009), Doidge, Karolyi, and Stulz (2008), Halling (2008),   
Buchanan and English (2007).   14
one restricting expropriation of minority shareholders by the controlling shareholders, 
rather than that of restricting empire building by unaccountable managers (Claessens 
et al., 2002). 
  In the simple model of Doidge et al (2004), it is assumed that a firm is fully 
controlled by a single shareholder who has the power to expropriate values from 
minority shareholders of the firm. The controlling shareholder has cash flow 
ownership in the firm denominated by α>0. It is exogenously determined by the 
history of the firm. The firm’s cash flow is denoted by CF. The controlling 
shareholder expropriates share v 0 of the firm’s cash flow. Because expropriation is 
costly, it has a deadweight cost to the firm’s cash flow (La Porta et. al., 2002). This 
cost is increasing in both the level of investor protection and in the fraction of cash 





b>0 is a constant and p>0 is the investor protection quality that applies to the 
minority shareholders of the firm from the country that the firm is listed. Thus, the 
total gain of the controlling shareholder is given by 




2   
where the first term is the share of cash flow that the controlling shareholder gets 
from his equity ownership and the second term is the proportion that he gets from 
expropriation. The firm has a growth opportunity, denoted by g. The distribution of 
growth opportunities across firms is assumed uniform over the interval (0, g
max). 
When the controlling shareholder makes a cross-listing decision, she meets a 
tradeoff problem. On one hand, the firm will fulfill its growth opportunity and get   15
access to lower cost of capital, taking advantage of risk sharing opportunities. This 
will increase the firm’s valuation and the controlling shareholder will benefit from it. 
On the other hand, it will become more costly to divert the firm’s value in a more 
stringent corporate governance regime than in the firm’s own country; thus decreasing 
the controlling shareholder’s utility. The optimal proportion of cash flow to divert is
11 








Calculation of the firm’s valuation using Tobin’s q; from the minority shareholder’s 
perspective yields   









2 g CF p bv v q CL CL CL CL     , if the firm is cross-listed to a more stringent 
corporate governance regime; where the firm realizes its growth opportunity g and 
CL p > p is the protection quality at the destination. 
   First, the main hypothesis is that for  CL p > p ceteris paribus firms that choose to 
cross-list should command a positive valuation premium, regardless of where they 
cross-list. Second, ceteris paribus, the higher the corporate governance quality in the 
destination stock exchange, the higher the cross-listing premium for a firm. In 
particular, the premium of firms that cross-listed in the US should be higher than that 
                                                        
11  This is obtained by the controlling shareholder maximizing her total gain with choice of the share to divert; see 
eg. Doidge et al 2004. The optimal cross-listing premium is,   




























and differentiating with respect to CL p , we get 
















  ; where * is strictly concave in pCL for the domain pCL  p.   16
of firms cross-listed in the UK, as . .S U p > . .K U p  it implies  . .S U  > . .K U   However, 
differences in the realized growth opportunities across countries may mitigate this 
effect, that is, even though  . .S U p > . .K U p , in the case where the realized growth 
opportunity in the UK is large enough relative to the US, or . .K U g > . .S U g , the premium 
difference may be negligible, or . .S U    . .K U  .  
5. Data 
In the empirical analysis, the most important variable is Tobin's q. It measures the 
valuation of firms and serves as the dependent variable. Following Doidge et al. 




tion Capitaliza Market Liability Total
Q TOBIN

 _ , 
where the denominator is the firm’s book value of total assets and the numerator is the 
firm’s book value of total liability plus its market capitalization. All the financial 
information used above is obtained at the fiscal year-end in 2004. For simplicity and 
data constraints, this measure does not use the market value of debt in the numerator 
and uses total assets instead of replacement cost in the denominator, which is the 
formal definition of Tobin’s q. Another concern for the measurement of q  is that 
because fast growing firms are more likely to acquire assets, they tend to have a 
relatively high book value of total assets. Following the work of Hirsch and Seaks 
(1993), we use the natural logarithm of q for the dependent variable in the regression 
analysis. 
The independent variables are the two cross-listing dummy variables for the US 
and UK. They take the value of 1 if cross-listed in the country and 0 otherwise. The   17
estimated coefficient will represent the cross-listing premium in each destination. We 
also include several firm-level and country-level variables as controls. First, two firm 
level variables are used to control for firm’s growth opportunities. SG2Y is the 
geometric mean of a firm’s annual sales growth rate in year 2003 and year 2004. 
INDU_Q is the median of Tobin’s q level of the selected firms in a certain industry, 
which is defined by 2-digit SIC code.   
COM_LAW is defined to have the value of 1 if the firm comes from common 
law origin countries, 0 otherwise. It is the rough proxy for the quality of corporate 
governance in the source countries. LIQ is the liquidity ratio of the selected countries. 
It is the dollar value of shares traded in a country’s equity markets divided by the 
country’s average market capitalization for the time period. Liquidity ratio is used to 
control for the liquidity explanation of cross-listing. SIZE is the log of sales (in 
million US$) of the firm at the fiscal year-end in 2004 and it captures the firm’s size. 
GDPG is the GDP growth rate of the firm's source country in the year 2004 thus 
controlling for macroeconomic factors. Table 4 describes the definitions of all the 
variables used in the regression models. 
The sample firms’ financial information comes from the WorldScope database 
(July 2005 Edition). This database keeps the financial information of more than 
25,000 public traded companies from 62 countries around the world. It represents 
approximately 95% of global market capitalization.   
We focus on firms from the six Asia-Pacific countries, including Australia, 
China, India, Japan, Korea and Taiwan. The reason to choose those six countries is   18
geographic since they are all in the Asia-Pacific region, which controls for the 
proximity factor for cross-listing decisions, plus they have cross-listed firm samples in 
both the U.S. and the U.K. There are 9,656 such firms in the WorldScope database in 
2004. 
To make firms' characteristic variables more comparable, we select the sample 
in the following way. First, we only study large firms, which have total assets greater 
than 100 million (in US$). According to LaPorta et al. (2002), shares of large firms 
are the most liquid, which undermines the concern that the differences in valuation are 
due to differences in liquidity.
12 By applying this rule, the sample decreases to 5,963 
firms. Then, we exclude observations from the finance, insurance and real estate 
industries by eliminating firms that have two-digit SIC code from 60 to 67. This is 
because the valuation ratios of financial institutions are usually not comparable to 
those of non-financial firms. This leaves us with 5,318 observations. Then, firms 
should have financial statements in 2004 disclosed in the WorldScope database. This 
is the period in which Tobin’s q is calculated. Firms should also have at least three 
years of sales data, so that we can calculate the average two-year sales growth rate.
13 
Finally, we drop 13 firms that cross-list in both destinations. The final sample contains 
4,491 firms. Then, we select the necessary financial information from each firm in the 
database to calculate TOBIN_Q, SG2Y, INDU_Q, and SIZE.  
                                                        
12  Large firms also have access to substitute mechanisms for limiting their expropriation of minority shareholders 
and increasing firms’ valuation, including public scrutiny, reputation building (Gomes 2000), foreign 
shareholdings, etc. It may make the effect of cross-listing overseas difficult to observe, and the results more 
conservative. 
 
13An average of sales growth rate gives us a more reliable measure of sales growth than just have one year sales 
growth rate.     19
The U.S. cross-listing information comes from the website of Bank of New 
York (Complete DR Directory). Bank of New York is one of the major custodians of 
ADR program in US. This bank discloses a complete ADR list. We restrict to Level II 
and III ADRs only, as the cross-listing literature has shown that only the Level II and 
III ADRs programs have a higher corporate governance quality (Doidge et al. 2004, 
Schrage and Vaaler 2005). We match the ADRs list from the website with our 4,504 
sample firms and obtain the CL_US dummy. There are totally 55 US only 
cross-listing observations. We then obtain the list of U.K. cross-listing firms from the 
London Stock Exchange. After applying the same match technique, we get the 
CL_UK dummy, which shows 41 cross-listing records in the UK only. 
Data for country-level variables are obtained from several other sources. They 
include the World Development Indicator from the World Bank for the LIQ and the 
GDPG, and LaPorta et al. (1998) and Djankov, La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, and 
Shleifer (2005) for the COM_LAW  dummy.   
To reduce the weight of outliers, we follow LaPorta et al. (2002) and censor 
TOBIN_Q at the 2
nd and 98
th percentiles by setting extreme values to the 2
nd and 98
th 
percentile values, respectively.   
Table 5 shows the descriptive statistics of the final sample. Table 6 provides the 
pairwise correlation coefficients of the variables.   
5.1 Empirical Models: OLS and Country Random Effects 
The model predicts that all the cross-listed firms have higher valuation than those 
not cross-listed. Potentially, firms cross-listed in the US could have a higher valuation   20
than firms cross-listed in the UK due to better governance, for a given identical 
realized growth opportunity; however this effect can be mitigated by better realized 
growth opportunities in the UK for example. We test those hypotheses using both 
OLS and country random effects by first estimating the following regression model:   
ic c c 6 c 5 i 4 ic 3
ic 2 ic 1 0 ic
a LIQ β LAW COM β Q INDUS β Y SG β
CL_UK β CL_US β β TOBIN_Q




where c indexes country and i indexes the industry within the country and q is in logs. 
The primary focus is to examine the signs and size of coefficients  1 β  and  2 β . The 
main hypothesis predicts that  1 β >0,  2 β >0 and  1 β > 2 β . The variable SG2Y is used 
to control for the growth opportunity of a specific firm. The variable INDUS_Q is 
used to control for the growth opportunity in a certain industry. Each of them should 
have a positive coefficient. If the high valuation of cross-listed firms is simply 
because they have better investment opportunities, controlling for growth opportunity 
in the regression should make the cross-listing premium disappear. The variable 
COM_LAW separates the countries into two legal origin group, common law group or 
civil law group. La Porta et al. (2002) have shown that countries with the common 
law legal origin have better protection of minority shareholders than do countries with 
civil law legal origin. If this is the case, firms from common law origin countries 
should have higher valuation and we should observe a positive sign for 5 β ,  5 β >0. 
The variable LIQ is used to control for liquidity factor of the source countries. The 
more liquid a country’s capital market, the higher the valuation of the firms that listed 
in that country, we predict  6 β >0.  
In order to study closely the valuation difference between the two destinations,   21
we take the difference of the two dummy variables. Let DIFF=CL_US-CL_UK and 
run  regressions  on  the  following  specification:         
ic c c 6 c 5
i 4 ic 3 ic 7 0 ic
a LIQ β LAW COM β
Q INDUS β Y SG β DIFF β β TOBIN_Q
    




If the effect of an increase in valuation is significantly different between the two 
destinations, we would observe 7 β >0. 
For each specification, we ran OLS regressions, and then use the country random 
effects method. The variable ac captures all unobserved country factors that affect 
Tobin_Qic, which do not change across industries.
14 In the random effects case, 
following Wooldridge (2002), we need to assume ac  is uncorrelated with each 
explanatory variable in all industries, i.e.,  0 ) , (  c ic a x Cov , where ic x stands for any 
explanatory variable in the previous regression functions. Define the composite error 
term as  ic c ic a v    . As ac is in the composite error in each industry, the  ic v   are 
serially correlated across industries, hence we apply the GLS transformation.
15   
                                                        
14  The fixed effects method is not applicable for this dataset, because the country characteristic variables 
COM_LAWc and LIQc are constant within a given country; if the fixed effects method is used, the two variables 
will be “differenced away” and the main source of corporate governance identification is lost.  
 
15  There is a positive serial correlation in the error term, where   





























Then, the transformed regression is   
) ( )
... ) ) 1 ( 1 1
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x x ( β β TOBIN_Q TOBIN_Q
 
  
   
      ,  
where the bar denotes the average.     is an unknown parameter, but can be estimated. 
^
  takes  the 
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2
a   and 
^
2
    is a consistent 
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2
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5.2 Self-selection and Treatment Effects 
In the regressions, the firm’s Tobin’s q is explained by whether or not the firm is 
cross-listed. However, because firms with better growth opportunities are more likely 
to list and better growth opportunities mean better valuation, it is highly likely that 
firms with higher q self-select themselves into the cross-listed group. Thus, the error 
in the regression will be correlated with the two cross-listing dummies and will cause 
bias. In turn, we apply the treatment effects method, e.g. Heckman (1979), Greene 
(1997), Wooldridge (2002). In particular, we can think of cross-listing as a treatment 
for the firm’s valuation. Each firm has a valuation outcome with and without this 
treatment; see appendix for technical details.   
Specifically, we use the treatment effect two-step method to investigate the 
valuation effect of cross-listing in the two destinations separately. We compare the US 
cross-listing group with the non cross-listing group to see the treatment effects of the 
US cross-listing. Then, we compare the UK cross-listing group with the non 
cross-listing group to investigate the cross-listing effect in the UK. We use the 
variable COM_LAW as the main identifier; e.g. La Porta et al. (2002).     
In the first step, the estimation of the decision equation uses probit:   
ic c 4
c 3 ic 2 c 1 0 ic
u GDPG
LAW COM SIZE LIQ CL_US
 
   

    _
 (3a) 
ic c 4
c 3 ic 2 c 1 0 ic
u GDPG
LAW COM SIZE LIQ CL_UK
 
   

    _
 (3b) 
    The independent variables included here are the key firm-level as well as 
country-level characteristics that influence the cross-listing decision. The country with   23
higher liquidity (LIQ) should be fertile ground for firms to expand and eventually 
cross-list. Also, larger firms, proxied by SIZE, are more likely to cross-list. Hence, we 
predict positive signs on parameters 1  and 2  . Firms from common law countries have 
better investor protection, thus are more likely to cross-list. And firms from fast 
growing developing countries will have better growth opportunity. They are more 
likely to cross-list. We predict positive signs on the parameters  3  and 4  . In the 
second step, after calculating ic  using the estimated results from the first step, the 
estimation of the valuation model uses ic    as a control variable and applies OLS:   
      
ic ic 8 Ic 5
i 4 ic 3 ic 1 0 ic
v β SIZE β
Q INDUS β Y SG β CL_US β β TOBIN_Q
  
   

_ 2
   (4a) 
      
ic ic 8 Ic 5
i 4 ic 3 ic 2 0 ic
v β SIZE β
Q INDUS β Y SG β CL_UK β β TOBIN_Q
  




All the parameters have the same predicted signs as those in the random effects model. 
The coefficient of lambda,  8 β  measures the extent to which unobserved factors that 
make cross-listing more likely to occur are associated with valuations, if positive 
(negative) cross-listing is more likely to occur with higher (lower) valuations.
16    
6. Empirical Results 
6.1 Univariate Analysis   
    Table 7 reports the mean level Tobin’s q for firms in each country by three 
categories, not cross-listed, cross-listed in the US, and cross-listed in the UK. It also 
presents the number of firms in each country by each category. There are totally 4,491 
firms in the dataset. Japan has the largest sample observations, which are 2,543 firms. 
                                                        
16  We are aware that variables that cause cross-listing may cause premium in valuations as well. We have 
proceeded with this identification scheme in an effort to examine the difference in premium between the US and 
UK destination.     24
Australia companies account for the smallest proportion, which are 198 firms.   
    The first column reports the number of firms that are cross-listed neither in the 
US nor the UK, and their mean level Tobin’s q by each country. The mean level 
Tobin’s  q varies widely across countries, from a minimum of 0.91 in Korea to a 
maximum of 1.56 in India. The second column shows the number of firms and the 
mean level Tobin’s q for firms that cross-listed in the US only. There are 55 US 
cross-listed firms in this sample. The proportion of firms that are listed in the US 
varies widely across-countries, from 4 and 7 firms in both Korea and Taiwan 
respectively, to 18 firms in Japan. It then shows the difference in Tobin's q between 
the US cross-listed firms and the non cross-listed firms. The difference in each 
country is positive, except for -0.02 in China, which is a small amount. The total 
difference is 1.51. The results indicate that the mean Q for firms that cross-listed in 
the US is significantly higher at the 0.01 level (with t-statistic=4.678) than that for 
non cross-listed firms. 
  Similarly, the third column provides information about the number of firm and 
the mean Tobin’s q for firms cross-listed in the UK, and also calculates the difference 
in q between the UK cross-listed firms and the non cross-listed firms in each country. 
Here we have 41 UK cross-listing observations. Again, Japan has the largest 
proportion, 12 of them. Australia has only 3 firms. Two countries have negative q 
differences, India and Japan; all others have positive differences. The total difference 
is 0.62. It is smaller than the total difference in the US case. The mean q for firms that 
cross-listed in the UK is also significantly higher at the 0.05 level (with   25
t-statistic=1.724) than that for the non cross-listed firms. We do find evidence that a 
cross-listing premium exists in the unconditional  univariate  analysis.             
6.2 Results from OLS and Random Effects Regressions 
    We present evidence on whether or not cross-listing premium can be explained 
by firm and country level characteristics. Table 8 provides the regression results of 
models (1) and (2). In each specification, we use both OLS and Random Effects. The 
inferences on the coefficients that test the hypothesis do not vary by changing from 
OLS to Random Effects method. 
In specification (1), we regress (log) Tobin's q on the two cross-listing dummies 
and the set of control variables. The OLS regression shows that the US cross-listing 
premium is significantly positive, an average increase of 17% in q value (from q=1). 
The UK cross-listing premium is positive, but not statistically significant. The 
Random Effects case produces similar results even though the average increase for the 
US is under 15%. There is some evidence on the valuation effect of cross-listing. The 
last row shows the test of differences in the coefficient on US cross-listing versus UK 
cross-listing. In the OLS case, the US effect is marginally statistically larger than the 
UK effect, but not in the Random Effects case. For the control variables, except for 
the LIQ, all the coefficients of control variables are significantly positive and the 
estimated signs are consistent with the predictions. In particular, fast growing firms 
and firms in fast growing industries have higher Tobin’s q; and firms have higher q in 
common law countries because of better investor protection.     
    In specification (2), we run the regression model (2) to investigate whether the   26
difference of the cross-listing premium between the US and the UK is significant. In 
both OLS and Random Effects model, cross listing premiums in the US are 
significantly larger than those in the UK; although less so in the Random Effects case.   
6.3 Results from Treatment Effect Regression   
     After the above analysis, we mitigate the self-selection problem by applying the 
treatment effects method and Table 9 presents the results. We investigate the treatment 
effects of the US cross-listing and the UK cross-listing separately. In each treatment 
effect regression, we also provide the results of the first stage probit regression.   
        The probit model results demonstrate that firms are more likely to cross-list their 
shares in overseas capital markets, such as the US and the UK when they are i. Large 
firms; ii. Firms from countries with higher liquidity; iii. Firms from countries that 
have better investor protection; and iv. Firms from fast growing countries.   
        The specification of treatment effects corresponds to specification (1) in Table 8. 
After applying the treatment effects technique, the cross-listing premium in the US is 
still positive and significant and much larger in magnitude of the order of 90% in q 
value (from q=1). The cross-listing premium in the UK is also positive, significant 
and even larger in magnitude. The empirical findings from the treatment effects 
regressions confirm the main hypothesis that cross-listing either in the US or in the 
UK has a positive effect on the firm’s valuation. However, the magnitude of the 
coefficients and standard errors show that there is a difference across the US and UK, 
in favor of the UK.   
  All control variables, are significant and have the expected sign, except for SIZE   27
which has a negative sign. The sign of  8 β  (the coefficient of lambda) is negative 
indicating that the error term in the decision equation and the valuation equation are 
negatively correlated. Thus, unobserved factors that make cross-listing more likely to 
occur are associated with lower valuations, thus cross-listing may provide an 
opportunity for a firm to improve and achieve higher market valuations. 
6.4 Test for the Slope Effects of Cross-listing 
Previous regressions focused on the cross-listing dummies, and showed the 
intercept difference in firm’s valuation due to the cross-listing. In table 10, we 
re-estimate the model (3)-(4) using the treatment effects regression, but at this time, 
we add several interaction terms. We interact the cross-listing dummies with all the 
other control variables allowing us to examine whether there are any differences in 
slopes due to cross-listing overseas. 
For the US regression, the cross-listing effect continues to be statistically 
significance. The interaction terms for the sales growth rate with the listing dummy is 
significant and positive. This means there are valuation differences between the listing 
and non-listing firms, but the gap increases as the growth opportunities increase. The 
governance interaction is significantly positive. The sign of the latter interaction is not 
consistent with the previous literature. Doidge (2004) argues that firms listing in the 
US are more valuable, the lower the corporate governance quality is in the home 
countries; the coefficients for the variable should be negative. The reason is that the 
firm in a lower governance quality home country has a lower valuation. Everything 
equal, the firm should have a higher premium if it chooses to cross-list. In our   28
analysis, the signs of the liquidity, industry and gross domestic product growth 
interaction terms are consistent with Doidge (2004), but they are not statistically 
significant.  
For the UK cross listing regressions, the cross-listing premium is also positive, 
significant and larger in magnitude. The signs for the interaction variables are 
qualitatively analogous to the US case and the difference across the US and UK 
cross-listing premium is again in favor of the UK. For the UK, the signs of the 
liquidity, industry and gross domestic product growth interaction terms are 
statistically significant. 
In general, our evidence shows that growth opportunities significantly increase 
the cross-listing premium, but the effects in the US and the UK destination are mixed 
depending on the statistical method. Hence, the main finding that cross-listing 
commands a premium and growth opportunities further increase the premium remains, 
but the empirical differences between the US and the UK destination from 
Asia-Pacific source countries are mixed in this sample.     
7. Summary and Conclusions 
    In this paper, we test hypothesis that cross-listing firms have higher valuation 
than non cross-listing ones, in general, allowing for several controls. We use data on 
public traded firms from six Asia-Pacific countries in 2003-2004. We perform means 
difference tests, OLS, the random effects and treatment effects regressions. The 
results generally confirm the hypothesis that cross-listing commands a premium on 
valuation; and growth opportunities further increase the premium. However, the   29
evidence of a difference in premium between the US and UK is mixed. We found 
some evidence in favor of the US in the univariate, OLS and random effects models. 
But, the results are not robust when the treatment effect methodology is applied; even 
when interactions with growth opportunities are taken into account, in the treatment 
effect case. Our evidence on observables is that cross-listing firms command a 
statistically significant premium; but we find no evidence in favor of US commanding 
higher premiums in the Asia-Pacific source countries. We found that unobserved 
factors that make cross-listing more likely to occur either in the US or the UK are 
associated with lower valuations, hence cross-listing provides an opportunity for a 
firm to improve and achieve better market valuations. 
        The main contribution of this paper is to provide evidence on the valuation effect 
of cross-listing on a major non-US market compared to the US market when the 
source nations are in the Asia-Pacific region. Regional and other geography effects 
and growth opportunities could be potential sources of mitigating factors for the 
effects of better corporate governance on the cross-listing premium. One policy 
implication is that the pattern of cross-listing shows that better firms from the 
Asia-Pacific region enjoy the benefits from bonding and prefer to cross-list in 
overseas stock exchanges, such as the US and the UK. This may mitigate the growth 
in the home country capital markets. Policy makers should be aware of this trend and 
try to develop regulations and policies that reinforce the corporate governance 
arrangements in their domestic markets. The development of governance standards 
may help develop local capital market and prevent domestic firms from cross-listing   30
shares overseas, thus raising the liquidity of their markets.     
    The study also has several limitations. First, there are few firms cross-listed in 
the sample. Second, ideally, we should obtain Tobin’s q before and after cross-listing 
for a specific firm, thus exploring the time dimension more fully. Also, a fruitful 
avenue for future research is to explore the effects of exogenous restrictions such as 
the Sarbanes-Oxley act in the US on firm’s decision to cross-list and possibly the 
inclusion of nominal monetary factors. 
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Appendix 
Let  y1 denote the outcome with treatment and y0 the outcome without treatment. 
Because a firm cannot be in both states, we cannot observe both y0 and y1 
simultaneously. Thus, we face the problem of missing data. Theoretically, the solution 
is to propose and estimate a model of the self-selection decision. That is to add a 
“decision equation” to the outcome equation. Formally, the model consists of the 
following two equations:   
i i i i CL X q        log   (Valuation  equation)  (A1) 
i i i u w CL    
*   (Cross-listing  decision  equation),  (A2) 
where under bars denote vectors or matrices. Equation (A1) is called the valuation 
equation. It is basically the model in the previous section, where Xi is the set of 
exogenous control variables and  i CL  is the dummy variable that equals one for a 
firm that cross-lists, zero otherwise. Because the firms that cross-list are not random 
and because their decisions are related to log q,  i CL  and  i    are correlated. Equation 
(A2) is the cross-listing decision equation. 
*
i CL   is an unobserved latent variable;  i w  
is a set of exogenous variables that affect the cross-listing choice, and  i w  and Xi may 
include common variables or even be identical. We assume that the cross-listing 
decision is determined by 
i CL =1, if 
*
i CL >0,  
i CL =0, if 
*
i CL <=0, (A3) 
Also, we assume i  and  i u  are jointly normally distributed with means zero, and 
standard deviations    and  u  , where  u  is normalized to one,   








































and is  the  coefficient  of  correlation.     
First, we check the case where we just estimate the valuation equation directly. 
The expected valuation for the firms that choose to cross-list will be   
       ] 1 | [ ] 1 | [log       i i i i i CL E X CL q E     
                   ) ( 1 i i i w X            , (A5)   38











, where  (.)  and 
(.)  are the density function and cumulative distribution function for the standard 
normal, respectively. The expected valuation for the firms that choose not to cross-list 
will be 
       ] 0 | [ ] 0 | [log      i i i i i CL E X CL q E    
                   ) ( 2 i i i w X          , (A6) 











. Then, the difference in expected value 
between cross-listed firms and non cross-listed firms (the cross-listing premium) is 
given by   
       ]
) 1 (
[ ] 0 | [ ] 1 | [log
i i
i
i i i i CL q E CL q E
  
    

    (A7) 
So, the difference estimated by the least squares coefficient on the treatment dummy 
variables will be biased. The selection problem is apparent.
17  
    Hence, we use the treatment effects two-step method to estimate (A1)-(A2) 
together. In the first step, the treatment effects method will use probit estimation to 
estimate in equation (A5). Those consistent estimates can be used to compute value 
for  1 i   and  2 i  . Then, in the second step, it applies OLS to estimate equation (A1) by 
adding an additional term, i  , which is calculated by  
       ) 1 )( ( ) ( 2 1 i i i i i i CL w CL w         .  
In sum, the corrected valuation equation should be estimated as follows: 
      l o g i i i i i v CL X q             (Corrected  valuation  equation)   (A8).
                                                        
17  There is an important issue of selection versus simultaneity in the problem examined in this paper, see 
Hajivassiliou and Ioannides (2007) for a discussion and application. In this paper, we focus on the selection 
problem using the Heckit methodology.   39
Figure 1. Foreign Listings and Total Value of Share Trading Around the World 







O t her s




O t her s
 
 
T o ta l v a lu e  o f s h a re  tra d in g (M illio n s  U S$)
U S




5, 169, 023. 6 
12%
O th e rs




O t her s
 





   40
Figure 2. Source Countries in Pacific-Asia Region: Australia, China, India, 
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Table 1.    Summary Information of Listings and Exchanges Around the 
World 
      








 Total  Value  of 
Share  Trading   
(in Millions US$) 
  Value  of  Share 
Trading-Foreign  
(in Millions US$) 
Foreign 
% 




Capitalization   
(in Millions US$) 
 Average  Daily 
Turnover     
(in Millions US$) 
AMERICAS                        
NYSE 2,293  1,834  459 11,618,150.7  976,385.2  8%  20 12,707,578.3  46,103.8 
Nasdaq 3,229  2,889  340 8,767,121.2  617,773.5  7%  23 3,532,912.0  34,790.2 
TSX Group  3,604  3,572  32 651,059.1  744.0  0%  4 1,177,517.6  2,578.5 
American SE  575  502  73 590,652.0  NA    20 83,018.9  2,352.2 
Sao Paulo SE  388  386  2 103,990.1  52.2  0%  - 330,346.6  417.6 
Mexican Exchange  326  151  175 45,388.8  1,327.8  3%  108 171,940.3  176.6 
Santiago SE  240  239  1 12,123.5  -  0%  - 116,924.3  48.9 
Buenos Aires SE  107  103  4 4,832.1  238.5  5%  - 40,593.8  19.2 
Colombia SE  106  106  - 2,079.6  -  0%  - 25,222.9  8.5 
Lima SE  224  192  32 1,560.4  238.1  15%  - 17,974.8  6.2 
Bermuda SE  58  21  37 67.6  -  0%  6 1,852.0  0.3 
Regional Total  11,150  9,995  1,155 21,797,025.1  1,596,759.3  7%  181 18,205,881.5  86,502   
                        
EUROPE-AFRICA-MIDDLE 
EAST 
                     
London SE  2,837  2,486  351 5,169,023.6 2,228,931.5  43%  10 2,865,243.2 
                
20,350.5  
Euronext 1,333  999  334 2,472,131.7  47,561.9  2%  12 2,441,261.4 
                
9,544.9    42
Deutsche Borse  819  660  159 1,541,122.7  137,001.0  9%  - 1,194,516.8  5,996.6 
BME Spanish 
Exchange 
   1,203,360.2 8,093.0  1%   940,672.9  4,794.3 
Borsa Italiana  278  269  9 969,234.2 94,532.0  10%  1 789,562.6  3,771.3 
Swiss Exchange  409  282  127 791,371.5  737,999.0  93%  1 826,040.8  3,115.6 
OMX Stockholm 
SE 
276 256  20 462,501.3  50,282.6  11%  5 376,781.1  1,828.1 
OMX Helsinkl SE  137  134  3 223,686.9  4,146.5  2%  - 183,765.4  884.1 
JSE South Africa  389  368  21 161,072.8  45,451.4  28%  1 442,525.5  641.7 
Istanbul SE  297  297  - 146,604.9  -  0%  - 98,298.9  588.8 
Oslo Bors  188  166  22 134,819.1  17,834.4  13%  4 141,624.2  532.9 
Copenhagen SE  183  176  7 106,058.2  2,243.9  2%  1 155,232.6  419.2 
Irish SE  65  53  12 45,143.7  1,021.1  2%  1 114,085.9  177.7 
Athens Exchange  341  339  2 44,383.3  218.3  0%  1 121,921.4  175.4 
Tel Aviv SE  578  573  5 33,066.7  -  0%  1 90,157.9  136.6 
Wiener Borse  120  99  21 24,158.6  405.7  2%  2 87,776.3  96.6 
Warsaw SE  230  225  5 16,269.3  273.5  2%  4 71,547.2  63.8 
Budapest SE  47  46  1 13,369.4  27.6  0%  - 28,630.4  52.6 
Tehran SE  402  402  - 12,125.2  -  0%  - 42,600.4  50.1 
Ljubijana SE  140  140  - 1,473.8  -  0%  - 9,676.8  5.8 
Luxembourg SE  234  42  192 645.2  40.6  6%  10 50,143.6 2.5 
Malta SE  13  13  - 93.5  -  0%  - 2,841.9  0.4 
Regional Total  9,316  8,025  1,291 13,571,715.8  3,376,064.0  25%  54 11,074,907.2  53,230 
                
ASIA-PACIFIC               
Tokyo SE  2,306  2,276  30 3,218,112.8  612.1  0%  1 3,557,674.4  13,081.8     43
Taiwan SE Corp.  702  697  5 718,804.4  296.7  0%  - 441,435.8  2,875.2 
Australian SE  1,583  1,515  68 523,668.5  10,214.0  2%  8 776,402.8  2,053.6 
Korea Exchange  683  683  - 488,408.3  -  0%  - 389,473.4  1,961.5 
Hong Kong 
Exchanges 
1,096 1,086  10 439,463.8  449.3  0%  - 861,462.9  1,764.9 
Shanghai SE  837  837  - 322,828.6  -  0%  - 314,315.7  1,328.5 
National SE India  957  957  - 260,409.2  -  0%  - 363,276.0  1,025.2 
Shenzhen SE  536  536  - 194,457.7  -  0%  - 133,404.6  800.2 
Osaka SE  1,090  1,090  - 134,361.7  -  0%  - 2,287,047.8  546.2 
Thailand SE  463 463  -   116,381.2  -  0%  - 115,390.4  475.0 
BSE, The SE 
Mumbai 
4,730 4,730   118,247.8  -  0%  - 386,321.1  465.5 
Singapore 
Exchange 
633 608  25 107,247.4  NA    - 217,617.8  423.9 
Bursa Malaysia  959  955  4 61,636.4  1,134.7  2%  - 181,623.8  248.5 
Jakarta SE  331  331  - 27,517.7  -  0%  - 73,250.6  114.2 
New Zealand 
Exchange 
200 158  42 17,034.2  1,473.0  9%  9 43,731.3  67.3 
Philippine SE  235  233  2 3,681.2  14.9  0%  - 28,602.0  14.9 
Colombo SE  242  242  - 575.2  -  0%  - 3,657.0  2.4 
Regional Total  17,120  16,934  186 6,752,836.1  14,194.7  0%  18 10,059,297.0  27,249 
               
Total 37,586  34,954  2,632 42,121,577.0  4,987,018.0  12%  253 39,340,085.7  166,980 
Source: World Federations of Exchanges, Annual Report and Statistics (2004)           44
Table 2. Comparison of the American Depositary Receipts by levels 
     
    Level-I Level-II  Level-III 
Description Unlisted  in  US 
Listed on Major US 
Exchange 
Offered and Listed 




OTC Pink Sheet 
trading 
NYSE, AMEX or 
Nasdaq 









Statement Form F-6 






Form 20-F filed 
annually 
Form 20-F filed 
annually; short 
forms F-2 and F-3 
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Table 3. Reporting and Regulatory Ranking of Eight Major Listing Locations Around the 
World.  
          















United States  7.27  7.29  7.17  7.28  8 
Canada 6.48  6.38  5.91  6.41  7 
United 
Kingdom 
5.84 5.87  6.09  6.02  6 
Netherlands 4.68  4.80  4.50  4.75  5 
France 4.11  4.50  4.13  4.17  4 
Japan 3.82  4.04 4.22  3.83  3 
Germany 3.96  3.90  4.04 3.81 2 
Switzerland 2.70  2.78  3.17  2.60  1 
Ranks are in descending order with 8 (1) indicating highest (lowest) disclosure level   
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Table 4. Variables Definition 
  
TOBIN_Q 
The sum of firm’s book value of total liability and its market 
capitalization divided by the firm’s book value of total assets; in 
logarithms in the regression analysis. 
  
CL_US 
Takes the value of 1 if the firm is cross-listed in the stock exchange in the 
US (NYSE or NASDAQ), 0 otherwise. 
 
CL_UK 
Takes the value of 1 if the firm is cross-listed in the London Stock 
Exchange, 0 otherwise. 
 
SG2Y 
Geometric mean of annual sales growth rate in 2003 and in 2004. 
 
INDU_Q 
Median of Tobin’s q of the selected firms in a certain industry. The 
industry is defined according to 2-digit SIC code. 
 
SIZE 
Log of sales (in million US$) at the fiscal year-end in 2004. 
 
LIQ 
Dollar value of shares traded in a country’s equity markets divided by the 
country’s average market capitalization for the time period 
 
GDPG 




Takes the value of 1 if the firm is selected from countries that have a 
common law origin, 0 otherwise. 
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Table 5. Summary 
Statistics 
     
        
Variable Obs  Mean  Median  Std  Dev  Min  Max 
Q (level)  4491  1.213 1.08 0.519 0.55  3.19 
TOBIN_Q (log)  4991  0.121 0.073 0.366 -0.60  1.16 
CL_US  4491  0.012 0 0.110 0  1 
CL_UK  4491  0.009 0 0.095 0  1 
SG2Y  4491  12.262  5.79  32.664 -77.56 960.56 
INDU_Q  4491  1.154 1.10 0.261 0.81  2.22 
COM_LAW  4491  0.090 0 0.287 0  1 
LIQ  4491  1.208 0.99 0.776 0.69  4.62 
GDPG  4491  4.701 2.70 2.782  2.7  9.5 
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Table 6. Correlation Matrix           
(Pairwise  Correlation  Coefficients)           
(Prob > |r| under H0: Rho=0)               
                 
    TOBIN_Q(log) CL_US  CL_UK  SG2Y  INDU_Q COM_LAW  LIQ  GDPG SIZE 
TOBIN_Q(log)  1.0000               
CL_US  0.0686 1.0000               
  (0.0000)               
CL_UK  0.0351 -0.0107  1.0000             
  (0.0185) (0.4735)               
SG2Y  0.2165 0.0110  0.0185  1.0000           
  (0.0000) (0.4625)  (0.2156)             
INDU_Q  0.1099 0.0163  0.0077  0.0142  1.0000         
  (0.0000) (0.2759)  (0.6077)  (0.3404)           
COM_LAW  0.1926 0.0777  0.0920  0.0554  0.0701  1.0000       
  (0.0000) (0.0000)  (0.0000)  (0.0002)  (0.0000)         
LIQ  0.0038 0.0380  0.0689  0.1071  -0.0346 -0.1316 1.0000     
  (0.7985) (0.0109)  (0.0000)  (0.0000)  (0.0206)  (0.0000)       
GDPG  0.2737 0.0181  0.0316  0.2797  0.0243  0.0349 0.1394  1.0000  
  (0.0000) (0.2249)  (0.0342)  (0.0000)  (0.1041)  (0.0195) (0.0000)     
SIZE  -0.0014 0.1806  0.1184  -0.0143  -0.0011 -0.0249 0.0278  -0.3346  1.0000 
    (0.0270) (0.0000)  (0.0000)  (0.3391)  (0.9391)  (0.0956) (0.0626)  (0.0000)  
Significance level in parentheses.                   49
 
Table 7. Univariate Analysis                    
                        
   Not  Cross  Listed  Cross Listed in US      Cross Listed in UK         
  Number    Mean  q  Number Mean  q  Diff  Number Mean  q  Diff  
Total 
Number 
Australia  187  1.49   8  1.65   0.16    3  1.97   0.48   198 
China  967  1.40   10  1.38   (0.02)    5  1.41   0.01   982 
India  189  1.56   8  2.19   0.63    12  1.33   (0.23)   209 
Japan  2516  1.12   18  1.41   0.29    9  1.07   (0.05)    2,543 
Korea  341  0.91   4  1.18   0.27    4  1.06   0.15   349 
Taiwan  195  1.29   7  1.47   0.18    8  1.55   0.26   210 
                        
Mean Q    1.21     1.51       1.35      
Total  4,395     55     1.51    41     0.62    4,491 
                        
Test of Difference Between Means                   
(one tailed two-sample t test with unequal variances)                     
Comparison     t-statistic                 
U.S.  >  Non  cross  listed    4.678***                 
U.K. > Non cross listed     1.724**`                                 
* p < 0.10; ** p < 0.05; *** p < 0.01.                         50
Table 8. The estimated coefficients from OLS and Random Effects regression 
Dependent Variable: Tobin_Q (log) 
         
   Specification  (1)  Specification (2) 
   OLS 
Random 
Effects  OLS 
Random 
Effects 
0.172 0.146     
CL_US 
(0.051)*** (0.051)**     
0.059 0.059     
CL_UK 
(0.043)* (0.042)*     
   0.073  0.056 
DIFF 
   (0.036)**  (0.036)* 
0.002 0.002  0.002 0.002 
SG2Y 
(0.000)*** (0.000)***  (0.000)*** (0.000)*** 
0.132 0.174  0.133 0.181 
INDU_Q 
(0.021)*** (0.028)***  (0.021)*** (0.029)*** 
0.216 0.211  0.224 0.217 
COM_LAW 
(0.022)*** (0.022)***  (0.022)*** (0.026)*** 
0.002 0.001  0.004 0.002 
LIQ 
(0.007) (0.007)  (0.007) (0.007) 
-0.084 -0.131  -0.086 -0.139 
CONSTANT 
(0.025)*** (0.033)***  (0.025)*** (0.034)*** 
       
Observations  4491 4491  4491 4491 
R
2  0.090   0.088  
Overall R
2  0.090     0.088 
CL_US= 
CL_UK 
F(1,4484) =   
2.92* 
Chi2(1)  =   
1.75      
 
* p < 0.10; ** p < 0.05; *** p < 0.01. Robust standard errors in parentheses.   
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Table 9. The estimated coefficients using Treatment Effects   
        
    Cross listing in the US  Cross listing in the UK 


















 0.902      
CL_US 
 (0.122)***      
     1.104 
CL_UK 
     (0.150)*** 
 0.002     0.002 
SG2Y 
 (0.000)***     (0.000)*** 
 0.145     0.145 
INDU_Q 
 (0.020)***     (0.020)*** 
0.862     1.092  
COM_LAW 
(0.158)***     (0.164)***  
0.142     0.219  
LIQ 
(0.060)**     (0.057)***  
 -0.339     -0.450 
Lambda 
 (0.054)***     (0.062)*** 
0.110     0.105  
GDPG 
(0.027)***     (0.030)***  
0.486 -0.014    0.359 -0.012 
SIZE 
(0.046)*** (0.004)***   (0.046)*** (0.004)*** 
-9.833 0.091    -8.297 0.069 
CONSTANT 
(0.744)*** (0.061)*    (0.745)*** (0.059)*** 
chi2   440.1***     382.9*** 
Observations 4450  4450  4436 4436 





   52
 
Table 10. Test for the Slope Effects of Cross-listing   
        
  Cross listing in the US    Cross listing in the UK 


















 0.953      
CL_US 
  (0.343)***     
     1.384 
CL_UK 
     (0.256)*** 
 0.002     0.002 
SG2Y 
 (0.000)***     (0.000)*** 
  0.005    0.009 
SG_CL 
  (0.002)***    (0.002)*** 
  0.145     0.144 
INDU_Q 
 (0.020)***     (0.021)*** 
  0.088     0.135 
IND_CL 
  (0.133)     (0.127) 
0.862     1.091   
COM_LAW 
(0.158)***     (0.164)***  
  0.251     0.150 
COM_CL 
  (0.076)***     (0.080)** 
0.142     0.219  
LIQ 
(0.060)**     (0.058)***  
  -0.009     -0.109 
LIQ_CL 
  (0.029)     (0.031)*** 
  -0.031     -0.056 
GDPG_CL 
  (0.014)*     (0.015)*** 
 -0.335     -0.520 
Lambda 
  (0.056)***     (0.070)*** 
0.110     0.105   
GDPG 
(0.027)***     (0.030)***  
0.486  -0.013   0.359  -0.013 
SIZE 
(0.046)***  (0.004)***   (0.046)***  (0.004)*** 
-9.833  0.085   -8.297  0.079 
CONSTANT 
(0.744)*** (0.062)*    (0.745)*** (0.061)* 
chi2   467.2***     413.0*** 
Observations  4450 4450   4436 4436 
* p < 0.10; ** p < 0.05; *** p < 0.01. Robust standard errors in parentheses.     
 